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Rangen, Inc. ("Rangen") submits the following Reply Brief to address the arguments made
the North Snake Ground Water District, Magic Valley Ground Water District, and Southwest
Irrigation District (collectively, the "Districts" or "GWDs" or "Respondents").

I.

ARGUME NT

The proposed v,:ater right that is at issue in this case serves no mitigation purpose. It is
simply a legal fiction that the GWDs have advanced in order to avoid curtailment without the
expense of actually mitigating for the depletive effect of their members' junior-prio rity
groundwater pumping. This fact is at the heart of the Director's decision to deny the District's
application. The Director is intimately familiar with the facts and circumstances surrounding this
application and nature of the proposed ''mitigation" use. The Director detennined that:
[T]he Districts' Application attempts to establish a means to satisfy the required
mitigation obligation by delivering water to Rangen that Rangen has been using for
fifty years. The Districts' Application is the epitome of a mitigation shell game.
The Districts' Application brings no new water to the already diminished flows of
the Curren Tunnel or headwaters of Billingsley Creek.
(A.R., Vol. 2, p. 364, i-134) 1 (Emphasis added). These findings are not disputed by the GWDs. Not
only has Rangen been using this water for more than fifty years, Rangen has a right to continue to
use the \Yater in the future under its own permit which the Districts stipulated to during the hearing
on this case. (A.R., Vol. 2, p. 353, FN4). The water the Districts are seeking to appropriate will
be used by Rangen regardless of whether this application is ,granted.
The Director's recognition of the Districts' mitigation shell game must infonn any analysis
of the Director's decision to deny this application. This is particularly true of the Director's
findings that the application was filed in bad faith and is not in the local public interest. The

1

The Clerk's Record on Appeal (R.) includes a disc of the agency record, exhibits, and hearing transcripts for the
Judicial Review of the Districts' Permit Application, labeled AR_2015-83 (AR.). These records shall be referred to
in the citations herein by "R." and "AR." accordingly.
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Districts' Response Brief does not address the issue of how this water right would provide any
mitigation or benefit to Rangen.
A.
The Director's interpretation of water appropriation rules and statutes is
entitled to great deference.
The Districts have asserted that this Court should exercise "free reviev.:'' of questions of
lav,·. Districts' Response Brief; p. 17. While this is true in many contexts, this appeal involves the
Director of the Department of Water Resource s' interpretation of various statutes and rules
governing the appropriation of water. In this context, there is no such "free review."
The concept of "free review" of agency decisions involving the interpretation of statutes
and regulations has been expressly rejected by this Court. See, JR. Simplot Co. Inc. v. Idaho State

Tax Commission, 120 Idaho 849, 820 P.2d 1206 (1991 ). In that case, this Court took careful pause
to reevaluate judicial review of issues involving questions of law. Guided by United States
Supreme Court decisions, this Court rejected "free review" holding as follows:
After reviewing our extensive case history, as well as the holdings of the U.S.
Supreme Court and various other state courts, we hold that the rule of deference to
agency statutory constructions retains continuing validity. We hold that a standard
of "free review" is not applicable to agency determinations.

Id. at 862. See also, Preston v. Idaho State Tax Commission, 131 Idaho 502, 504, 960 P.2d 185,
(I 998), citing JR. Simplot Co. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, supra.
The rule the JR. Sirnplot Court upheld was as follows:
However, the courts are not alone in their responsibility to interpret and apply the
lmv. As the need for responsive government has increased, numerous executive
agencies have been created to help administer the law. To carry out their
responsibility, administrative agencies are generally "clothed with power to
construe [the law] as a necessary precedent to administrative action." As a result,
this Court has long followed the rule that the construction given to a statute by the
executive and administrative officers of the State is entitled to great weight and \Vill
be followed by the courts unless there are cogent reasons for holding otherwise.

Id. at 854. (Citations omitted).
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Having rejected "free review," this Court established a "four-prong" test to detennine the
of deference that can be given to agency decisions. That test is as follo\vs:
Where an
interprets a statute or rule, this Court applies a four-pronged test
to detennine the appropriate level of deference to the agency interpretation. This
Court must detennine whether: ( 1) the agency is responsible for administration of
the rule in issue; (2) the agency's construction is reasonable; (3) the language of the
rule does not expressly treat the matter at issue; and (4) any of the rationales
underlying the rule of agency deference are present. There are five rationales
underlying the rule of deference: (1) that a practical interpretation of the rule exists;
(2) the presumption of legislative acquiescence; (3) reliance on the agency's
expertise in interpretation of the rule; (4) the rationale of repose; and (5) the
requirement of contemporaneous agency interpretation.
Duncan v. State Bd ofAccountancy, 149 Idaho 1, 3,232 P.3d 322,324 (2010).
The District Court failed to give the proper deference to the Director's interpretation of the
applicable statutes and rules as required by JR. Simplot and Duncan.
B.

The Director's finding of bad faith should be affirmed.

The GWDs argue that the Director: "[I]nterpreted Adjudication Rule 45.01.c to require
construction of infrastructure, then found that the Application did not propose new construction,
and denied it on that basis." (Districts' Response Brief, p. 20). The Districts argue that this
interpretation is "contrary to law and leads to absurd results." Id. at 21.
The District's argument is based upon two premises: (I) that the Court should exercise
"free reviev/' over the Director's interpretation of IDAPA 37.03.08.045.01.c; and (2) that the
Director's interpretation and ruling can be narrowly construed as requiring new construction.
Neither of these premises is correct. The Districts also contend that the Director's detennination
that the Districts' application does not propose a "project'' is not supported by substantial
competent evidence. Districts' Response Brief p. 24. This is also incorrect.
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The Director's interpretation of Rule 45.01.c should be given great
deference.
1.

This court does not exercise "free review" of an agency's interpretation

Preston

1·.

a statute or rule.

Idaho State Tax Commission, 131 Idaho 502, 504, 960 P.2d 185, (1998), citing JR.

Simplot Co. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 120 Idaho 849,862,8 20 P.2d 1206, 1219 (1991). As set
forth in section A above, courts revie\ving an agencv' s internretation of statutes and rules are
.._,

.._,

.,

,A

required to perfonn a "four-pronged" test to detennine what deference to give the agency. Duncan

v. State Bd. of Accountancy, 149 Idaho 1, 3, 232 P .3d 322, 324 (20 I 0). Despite acknowledging
the appropriate "four-pronged" test, the Districts argue that "[ w ]hether Rule 45.01 requires new
construction is a question of law over which courts exercise 'free review.'" The argument was
expressly rejected by this Court in J.R. Simplot Co., supra. With the proper application of the fourpronged test, the Director's interpretation of Rule 45.0 I .c is entitled to great deference.

2.
The Districts have misconstrued both Rangen's argument and the
Director's ruling regarding the existence of a "project."
The Districts argue that the Director "[I]nterpreted Adjudication Rule 45 .0 l.c to require
construction of infrastructure, then found that the Application did not propose new construction,
and denied it on that basis." Districts' Response Brief, p. 20. The Districts claim, and the District
Court agreed, that requiring "new construction" leads to absurd results because some water right
applications involve the use of existing diversions rather than new construction. (R., p. 194). The
Districts' argument does not fairly frame the Director's decision.
As Rangen argued in its opening brief, the Director's ruling can more fairly be read as
requiring an identifiable project that can be completed in order to perfect the \Vater right rather
than imposing a specific requirement of "new construction." The Director found that the lack of
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such an identifiable project is an impediment to completion of the project. This is a reasonable
interpretation of Rule 45.01.c.
This is a unique case because the GWDs do not propose to use the \Vater for which the
application is filed. The GWDs propose that Rangen will use the water. Essentially, the GWDs
seek to obtain a \Vater right by doing nothing more than observing and identifying potentially
unappropriate d water.
In this case, the Rule on good faith allows the Director to examine the substantive actions
or intent of the parties to construct or complete the project. "The judgment of another person's
intent can only be based upon the substantive actions that encompass the proposed project."
IDAPA 37.03.08.045. 01.c. In this case, the Director did examine the intent of the GWDs in
seeking the pennit. Even though the Rules specifically contemplate a "project" and "construction "
of the project, the Director concluded that the Application was filed in bad faith because the GWDs
had no intent, at the time the Application was filed, to complete any project. The GWDs' intent
was to simply obtain the Pennit and assign it to Rangen. Lynn Carlquist, testifying on behalf of
the GWDs, stated:

Q.

And when I asked you last time [at your deposition], you told me that it was
your intent it obtain the pennit and then assign the pennit to Rangen for us to
perfect; correct?
A.
Well, that would be the easiest way for us to perfect it, if they would agree
to that.

Q.
Okay. So you would be taking advantage of Rangen's existing fish facility
that it built, correct, to do that?
A.

Yes.

Q.
You would be taking advantage of the diversion apparatus that Rangen has
built and has had in place for 50 years to do that; correct?
A.

That's correct.
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(A.R., Tr. p. 75, 1. 23-25; p. 76, L 1-11 ).
Based on that testimony, and what the Rules require, the Director made a factual finding
the application was

bad faith:

26. The District's Application ,vas filed in bad faith because, for a majority of the
quantity of water sought to be appropriated, there is a threshold impediment to
"completion of the project." To perfect a project for a water right, there inherently
must be completion of works for beneficial use. The testimony of Lynn Carlquist
quoted above demonstrates the Districts' intent at the time of filing the Districts'
Application ,vas to simply obtain the Permit and assign it to Rangen to perfect by
utilizing the water in the Rangen facility the ,vay Rangen has done for the last fifty
years. The initial filing by the Districts did not contemplate any construction of
works and completion of any project. Furthennore, even at this point, with respect
to at least 8.0 cfs of the 12 cfs the Districts propose for appropriation, Rangen will
continue to divert through its existing Bridge Diversion. There is no "project" and
consequently cannot be a "completion of the project" for the 8.0 cfs, because the
8.0 cfs will be diverted through the existing Bridge Diversion without any
construction of a project or any completion of works for beneficial use. The
Districts' Application fails the bad faith test based on the threshold question of
whether there will be a project, and whether there will be any construction of works
for perfection of beneficial use.
(A.R., Vol. 2, p. 362).
With regard to water flowing through the bridge diversion, the GWDs propose to simply
identify unappropriated water in Billingsley Creek, utilize Rangen's existing bridge diversion, and
without perfonning a single act, obtain a mitigation right to satisfy the mitigation obligation that
the GWDs' members have towards Rangen. In this unique circumstance, the Director found that
there was not an identifiable project that could be completed. The Director's interpretation of the
Rule and his finding factual detennination are entitled to great deference and should not have been
reversed.

3.
The Director's determination that the Districts do not intend to
complete a project is supported by substantial competent evidence.
After filing the application, the GWDs amended their proposal to include a pump that
would take 4 cfs of water from the bridge diversion and divert it to Rangen's hatch house, green
RANGEN, INC.'S REPLY BRIEF - 6

house and small raceways (collectively "hatch house"). (A.R., Vol. 1, p. 193-4). This water would
no longer go through the bridge diversion to the large raceways. This involves actually building a
pump station on Rangen's property

the bridge

This

involves a

reconfiguration ofRangen's research hatchery that is not beneficial for the use of the hatchery. It
is very important for this Court to understand that Rangcn has never diverted water from the bridge
diversion to the hatch house.

More importantly, Wayne Courtney, Rangen Executive Vice-

President, testified at the Administrative Hearing that Rangen did not want water to be diverted
from the bridge diversion to the hatch house. (A.R., Tr., 248, 11. 7-18).

The GWDs themselves

have indicated that they would only move water to the extent Rangen wanted \vat er moved. ( A.R.,
Tr. p. 89, 1. 1-19).
The GWDs' proposal to build the pump station appears to have been made solely to give
the GWDs an argument that they have a project that can be completed. They are proposing to use
eminent domain powers to force the reconfiguration of Rangen's research facility even though
Rangen does not want it. The pump that the GWDs have proposed serves no mitigation or other
useful purpose to Rangen. The Director concluded that the GWDs do not intend to complete any
project, and his finding is supported by substantial competent evidence. As such, it should not
have been reversed.
C.
The Court Should Affirm the Director's Denial of the Application Because
the Districts' Application is Speculative.

In Section 2 of their response brief, the GWDs state: "Rangen now contends that the
District Court erred by addressing its argument concerning speculation." Districts· Response

Brief, p. 29. It is important to clarify Rangen's position. When the GWDs appealed the Director's
decision to the District Court, Rangen argued an alternative basis for affirming the Director's
decision. Rangen argued that the decision could be affinned because the permit \Vas "speculative."
RANGEN, INC. 'S REPLY BRIEF - 7

The District Court ruled that the pennit was not speculative, but also expressly declined to
"prejudge" the issue of whether the GWDs actually have the eminent domain powers to perfect
their application. (R., p. 202-03 ).

light of this ruling, Rangen's position is that rather than make

a legal determination that the pennit was not speculative, the District Court should have sent the
case back to the Director to determine whether the Districts have the authority to actually perfect
their application and whether that authority was properly exercised when the application was filed.
There are two critical issues of fact which are uncontested. Those facts are that the GWDs
do not own the place of use (POU) or point of diversion (POD) designated by the Application.
The long-standing rule in Idaho and most every other jurisdiction with respect to perfecting a water
right on property not owned by the water user, is as follows:

It is quite generally held that a water right initiated by trespass is void. That is to
say, one who diverts water and puts it to a beneficial use by aid of a trespass does
not, pursuant to such trespass, acquire a \Yater right. Any claim of right thus
initiated is void.
Lemmon v. Hardy, 95 Idaho 778, 780, 519 P.2d 1168 (1974), citing Bassett v. Swenson, 51 Idaho
256, 5 P.2d 722 (1931). (Emphasis added); see also, Joyce Livestock v. US.A., 144 Idaho 1, 18,
156 P.3d 502, (2007); Branson v. Miracle, 107 Idaho 221,227, 687 P.2d 1348 (1984).
There are two ways for a party to perfect a water right when that party who is applying for
a pennit does not own the POU or POD. The first way is for the party to have an agency
relationship with the owner of the property where the water right is sought. Colorado Rh'er Water

Conservation District v. Vidler Tunnel Water Company, 594 P.2d 566 (Colo. 1979); see e.g.,
Bacher v. State Engineer oflvevada , 146 P.3d 793, 799 (Nev. 2006). In this case, the uncontested
fact is that the GWDs do not have any agency relationship with Rangen.
The second way to perfect a water right for a party who does not own the POU or POD is
to properly exercise eminent domain authority. Lemon v. Hardy, supra. This raises two separate
RANG EN, INC. 'S REPLY BRJEF - 8

inquiries: (I) whether the GWDs have the legal authority to seek eminent domain; and (2) even if
they have the right of eminent domain, whether the GWDs properly exercised this authority when
they filed the application. Rangen addressed both of these

Opening Brief, but it is

important to clarify the following points.
The first inquiry is whether the GWDs have the legal authority to seek eminent domain for
the purposes of this permit. Exercising eminent domain in this case \Vould require not only the
authority to condemn Rangen's bridge diversion, but also the authority to install a pump and
reconfigure how water flows through the Rangen facility over Rangen's objection. On this issue,
both the Director and the District Court declined to address whether the GWDs had the legal
authority necessary to gain access to Rangen's property. On the issue of whether the GWDs had
actual authority to exercise eminent domain, the trial court stated:
Rangen also raises several arguments regarding the ability of the Districts to
exercise their eminent domain powers to perfect their application for pennit. Since
issues of that nature are more appropriate ly addressed in the context of a challenge
to a condemnat ion proceeding , the Court, so as to not prejudge the issues, will not
address these arguments. The fact that the Districts have the express statutory
authority to exercise the power of eminent domain for the condemnat ion of private
property for easements, rights-of-w ay, and other rights of access to property
necessary to the exercise of their mitigation powers is sufficient for the purposes of
a speculation analysis.
(R., p. 203).
Second, regardless of whether the GWDs have the legal authority to exercise eminent
domain, an important issue for this appeal is whether the GWDs actually considered and voted to
exercise their eminent domain powers in connection with the filing of their application.

2

The

GWDs are political subdivisions. Under their statutory powers, the GWDs have the authority to:

2
The Districts contend that Rangen does not have standing to challenge the validity of the GWDs · actions. See
Districts' Response Brief p. 45. Rangen has standing to contest the exercise of the GWDs' authority since the POU
and POD for the water right under the application are wholly located on Rangen's property. Rangen has asserted the
necessary "distinct palpable injury" necessary to have standing. See Young v. Ketchum, 137 Idaho l 02, 44 P.3d 1157
(2002); Martin v. Camas County, 150 Idaho 508,248 P.3d 1243 (2011).
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( 1) file applicatio ns for water rights, LC. § 42-5224( 8); and (2) exercise eminent domain for rights
way, I.C. § 42-5224( 13). Under LC. § 42-5223( 3), the statute that immediat ely precedes the
statutory

of the Board, the only way for the GWDs to

their statutory powers is for

a majority of the Board to act at a meeting where a quornm exists:
The board of directors shall hold a regular monthly meeting in the district's office
on the first Tuesday in every month or such date each month as it shall fix by
resolution , and such special meetings as may be required for the proper
transaction of business. Special meetings may be held on seventy-t\VO (72) hours'
notice of the chairman or a majority of the members . A majority shall constitute

a quorum for the transaction of business and the concurrence of a majority of
the members shall be necessary to constitute the action of the board. All

meetings of the board shall be public and ali records of the board shall be open to
the inspectio n of any member water user, or represent ative thereof during business
hours.
LC. § 42-5223( 3) (Emphasi s added).

In this case, the uncontest ed fact is that the GWDs never held any meeting to authorize the
filing of the applicatio n and submitted no evidence establishi ng their Boards' decision to authorize
the exercise of their eminent domain authority. The only evidence in the record from the GWDs
is the testimony of Lynn Carlquist , a Director of the North Snake Ground Water District, who
testified that no meeting was ever held to consider and vote on the filing of the applicatio n:
Q. (Haemme rle); That's my question, whether there was an official board meeting on

behalf of your groundwater district to take action to filed the permit.

A. (Carlquis t) Not for this specific permit, no. But there were - there were the
conferenc e discussio n over the phone to say "Yes, we approve. Let's go after it and
get this pennit filed for it."
Q. But there was no official convenin g of the board to take that kind of action?
A. Not in person.
Q. And you don't really recall what any of the other districts did or didn't do, do you?
A. No, I don't. I do know that there were phone conversat ions with the other districts.
RANGEN, INC.'S REPLY BRIEF - 10

(A.R., Tr., p. 69, IL 19-25; p. 70, 11. 1-8). (Emphasis added).
Resolutions from the North Snake Groundwat er District (A.R., Exh. 1076) and Magic
Ground\vat er District (A.R.,

1077) ( collectively "Resolution s") \Vere produced at the

administrat ive hearing on the application . The Southwest Irrigation District never produced a
Resolution.

The Resolutions were dated September 16, 2014, or a single day before the

administrat ive hearing on the Application . According to Lynn Carlquist, the Resolutions were
executed at a Special Meeting just prior to the administrat ive hearing held on September 17, 2014.
There were no Resolution s authorizing the law firm of Racine, Olson, Nye, Budge & Bailey,
Chartered (''Racine") to execute the Application for the pennit prior to September 16, 2014.
Q. So there were no corporate resolutions at the time any of the pennits were filed?
A. That's correct.
(A.R., Tr., 31, 11. 22-24).
Furthermor e, the Resolution s only authorized the filing of the application . The Resolution s
did not authorize the initiation of any eminent domain proceeding against Rangen.

The

Resolutions , in pertinent part, stated:
RESOLVE D, the Board confinns the authority of Racine to file application for
water right permit no. 36-16976 on behalf of the District, and to represent the
District in all other current and future proceeding s before the IDWR to which the
District is a party; and
Further RESOLVE D, the Board reaffims the Special Power of Attorney for Water
Rights executed by the District on May 2, 2014, confirming the authority of Racine
to represent the District in all current and future proceeding before the IDWR to
\Vhich the District is a party.

(See e.g., A.R., Exh. 1076 and 1077).
Political subdivision s, in this case the groundwat er districts, only have authority to act in
duly noticed and constituted meetings. LC. § 42-5223. If the governmen t body does not properly
exercise its authority, the governmen t body's lawyers cannot act on their own and validate an
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illegally exercised authority of the political subdivision. Attorneys for political subdivisi ons are
not authorized to take action for the political body, without the political body holding an authorize d
to transact
To summarize, Lemmon r. Hardy is controlling. The GWDs do not own the POD or POU
for the water right described in the application. The Departme nt's Rules require that a pennit
Applicant "shall have legal access to the property necessary to construct and operate the proposed
project, [or] has the authority to exercise eminent domain authority to obtain such access." IDAPA
37.03.08.45.c.i In this case, there are no findings that the GWDs, in fact or law, have the authority
to seek eminent domain to take Rang en's property to perfect this application. Even if they do, the
GWDs failed to present any evidence that those powers were exercised in an open meeting. For
these reasons, the application should have been denied, or the case remanded to the Director for
further findings.

D.
Attorneys are Not Exempt from the Requirement to Submit Evidence of
Authority \Vhen Signing an Application for Permit on Behalf of a Client.
The

Districts

contend

that

Rangen

1s

asking

IDWR

to

interpret

IDAPA

3 7.03.08.035.03.b.xiv in a manner that goes beyond its plain language. Districts' Response Brief,
p. 40. The Districts argue: "The Rule states applications 'may be signed by a person having a
current power of attorney.'

It does not mention licensed attorneys, let alone require licensed

attorneys to provide a written 'pmver of attorney' before acting on behalf of their clients." See id.
The Districts' have misconst rued Rangen's position.
Rangen's position is that the plain lan6ruagc of Rule 35.03.b requires an attorney to submit
evidence of authority to sign an application for pennit when it is filed with the Department.
Evidence of that authority may be in the fonn of a power of attorney or it may be in another fonn
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like a motion or a resolution. Rangen's point is that attorneys are not exempt from the requirem ent
to submit evidence of the express authorization of their client. Rule 35.03.b states in relevant part:
b. The following information shall be shown on an application for permit form and
submitted together with the statutory fee to an office of the department before the
application for pennit may be accepted for filing by the department.

***
xii. The application form shall be signed by the applicant listed on the
application or evidence must be submitted to show that the signatorv has
authoritv to sign the application. An application in more than one (I) name shall
be signed by each applicant unless the names are joined by "or" or "and/or."
xiii. Applications by corporations, companies or municipalities or other
organizations shall be signed by an officer of the corporation or company or
an elected official of the municipality or an individual authorized by the
organization to sign the application. The signatory 's title shall be shown with the
signature.
xiv. Applications may be signed by a person having a current "power of attorney"
authorized by the applicant. A copy of the "power of attorney" shall be included
with the application.
IDAPA 37.03.08.035.03.b (emphasis added).
The Districts contend that attorneys are exempt from this rule by virtue of the attorneyclient relationship. Their position is that everyone knows that Thomas J. Budge and Randy Budge
represent the Districts and it would be "utterly unjust" to enforce the requirement of submitting
evidence of express authorization. They claim that this is a mere "technicality" and a "trap for the
unwary." Districts ' Response Brief, p. 45. The Districts' arguments miss the mark for several
reasons.
To begin with, the Districts' reliance on Storey v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co.,
32 Idaho 388, 183 P. 990 (1919) is misplaced. The Districts quoted the following language from
Storey to support their position:

The relationship between an attorney and client is one of agency. The answer to
whether an attorney can bind his client by a stipulation rests in whether the subject
RANGEN, INC.'S REPLY BRIEF - 13

of the stipulation falls within the scope of the attorney's implied authority, and if it
is outside the attorney's implied authority, whether the client has actually
authorized or later ratified his actions. It is generally recognized that an attorney
has ... the general implied or apparent authority to enter into or make such
agreements or stipulations, with respect to procedural or remedial matters, as
appear, in the progress of the cause, to be necessary or expedient for the
advancement of his client's interest or to accomplishment of the purpose for which
the attorney is employed." Yet it is \veil settled that" ... The implied authority of
an attorney ordinarily does not extend to the doing of acts which will result in
surrender or giving up any substantial right of the client.
Districts' Response Brief, p. 41, quoting Storey, 32 Idaho 388 at 392, 183 P. 990 at 991. This

language does not support the Districts' position, but rather, undermines it.
The Storey decision makes it clear that an attorney is the agent of the client. While an
attorney has implied authority to handle procedural or remedial matters that come up while a case
is pending, the attorney cannot do anything that affects the client's substantive rights without
express authority. The Storey Court held: "It is generally recognized that an attorney has ' ... the
general implied or apparent authority to enter into or make such agreements or stipulations, with
respect to procedural or remedial matters, as appear, in the progress of the cause, to be necessary
or expedient for the advancement of his client's interest or to accomplishment of the purpose for
which the attorney is employed.'" Id., 32 Idaho 388 at 392, 183 P. 990 at 991 (Emphasis added).
The signing and filing of an application for pennit to appropriate the waters of this state is not a
procedural or remedial matter.
The appropriation of water creates a real property interest, and as discussed above, will
require the Districts to exercise their eminent domain powers against Rangen since the POU and
POD are located on Rangen's property. See Nettleton v. Higginson, 98 Idaho 87,558 P.2d 1048
(1977); Neilson v. Parker, 19 Idaho 727, 115 P. 488 (1911); LC.§ 55-101. The decision to file
the application for pennit is a serious undertaking that can only be authorized by the Districts'
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Boards of Directors. The signing and filing of the Districts' application was not part of the
attorney's implied authority.
While the Districts seem to balk at the assertion that an attorney must submit written
evidence of authority to sign an application for pennit, this Court has made it clear that attorneys
are not exempt from this type ofrequirem ent. In Ogden v. Griffith, I 49 Idaho 489, 494, 236 P.3d
1249, 1254 (2010), this Court held that the written power of attorney requirement set forth in I.C.
§ 9-503, the statutory codificatio n of the statute of frauds for real estate transactions, applies to
attorneys. Section 9-503 states:
No estate or interest in real property, other than for leases for a term not exceeding
one (I) year, nor any trust or power over or concerning it, or in any manner relating
thereto, can be created, granted, assigned, surrendered, or declared, otherwise than
by operation of law, or a conveyance or other instrument in vvriting, subscribed by
the party creating, granting, assigning, surrenderin g or declaring the same, or by
his lawful agent thereunto authorized by writing.
I.C. § 9-503 ( emphasis added).
The failure to submit evidence of Thomas J. Budge's authority to sign with the application
means that the Districts' application was incomplete under Rule 35.01.d and no priority was
established:
All applications for permit to appropriate public water or trust water of the state of
Idaho shall be on the form provided by the department entitled "Applicatio n for
Pennit to Appropriat e the Public Waters of the State ofldaho" and shall include all
necessary information as described in Subsection 035.03. An application for permit
that is not complete as described in Subsection 035.03 vvill not be accepted for filing
and will be returned along with any fees submitted to the person submitting the
application. No priority will be established by an incomplete application.
Applications meeting the requiremen ts of Subsection 035.03. will be accepted for
filing and will be endorsed by the department as to the time and date received. The
acceptabili ty of applications requiring clarification or corrections shall be
determined by the Director.
ID APA 37.03.08.03 5.01.d ( emphasis added); see also ID APA 37.03.08.03 5.02.b ("The priority of
an application ... is established as of the time and date the application is received in complete
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fonn .... )" While Rangen contends there are serious issues as to whether the Districts ever
la1,vfully authorized the filing of the application (see Section C above), the earliest priority date
that could possibly be given to the Districts' application for permit is the date of the hearing when
the Districts submitted the resolutions authorizing the Racine finn to sign on behalf of the Districts
(see A.R., Exh. 1076 and I 077) and Lynn Carlquist testified.

The Districts' final ar&'l.nnent is that it 1,vould be "utterly unjust" to enforce the requirement
that an attorney submit evidence of authority when signing and filing an application for permit.
What would be unjust in this case is the granting of a pennit for what the Director expressly found
was nothing but a "mitigation shell game."

E.
The Director correctly held that granting the application was not in the local
public interest.
The Districts filed this application seeking to appropriate \Vater for "mitigation." Such a
purpose of use presumes that the manner in which the water is used will mitigate for depletions
due to the applicant's use of other water rights. As Rangen has argued in this matter, the simple
description "mitigation" does not describe how the use of the water will actually mitigate. The
Districts have steadfastly refused to explain how this water right would benefit anyone that is
suffering injury due to depletions caused by groundwater pumping. The Director detennined that
there was no benefit from granting this pennit and that it is not in the local public interest.
The Director is required pursuant to LC. § 42-203A(5) to deny a water right "if it will
conflict with the local public interest as defined in LC. § 42-202B." The local public interest is
defined as "the interests that the people in the area directly affected by the proposed water use have
in the effects of such use on the public \Vater resource." LC. § 42-202B. The Director is well
aware of water shortages suffered not only by Rangen, but also other water users in the local area
and downstream on Billingsley Creek. Approval of this application has the potential to affect the
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public water resources dramatically. Ultimately, the Districts intend to use this water right as part
of a mitigation plan that \Vould allmv widespread continued depletion of the ESP A. Of course, the
will be able to deny that mitigation plan and will almost certainly be required to

so

given that this is merely a "mitigation shell game. " 3 Ho\vever, there is no reason to require the
Director to delay consideration of these issues for a mitigation plan proceeding.
The Director found that:
The District's application is the epitome of a mitigation shell game. The Districts'
Application brings no new water to the already diminished flows of the Curren
Tunnel or headwaters of Billingsley Creek.
(A.R., Vol. 2, p. 364, i\34). The approval of a "mitigation" water right that provides no mitigation
benefit has a direct effect upon the public water resource because it allows continued depletion of
the aquifer without mitigation. Consequently, the Director did not exceed his authority by denying
the Districts' application. The District Court erred by failing to give the appropriate deference to
the Director's interpretation and application of I.C. § 42-202B. See JR. Simplot Co. Inc. v. Idaho

State Tax Commission, 120 Idaho 849,820 P.2d 1206 (1991).
F.
use.

The Director erred -when he allo\ved "mitigation" as a permitted purpose of

Rangen stands on the arguments it made in its Opening Brief concerning why "mitigation"
as a proposed purpose of use should not be allowed. See, Rangen, Inc. 's Opening Brief, p. 28.
One issue, however, needs further elaboration.
Both the District Court and Director relied on the definition of"mitigat ion plan" under I.C.
§ 42-520 I ( 13) to support their respective conclusions that the GWDs' application for "mitigation"

3

Regarding the Director's finding that the GWDs' application brings no new water to the already diminished flows
of the Curren Tunnel or headwaters of Billingsley Creek, the District Court noted that "[I]ndeed, this consideration
may have relevance in any proceeding seeking the approval of any mitigation plan for which the appropriation is
intended,'' (R., p. 199).
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water should be allowed. LC. § 42-5201(13) defines "mitigation plan" as a "plan to prevent or
compensate for material injury to holders of senior water right caused by the diversion and uses of
water holders of junior priority groundwater rights who are participants in a mitigation plan."
The Director, incorporating the decision of the Hearing Officer, and using the definition of
"mitigation plan" under Section 42-5201, concluded: "In Order for the proposed senior use to be
viable, it must prevent material injury to senior water rights or compensate senior water right
holders for material injury." (A.R .. p. 358). Applying this definition, the Director concluded that
the GWDs' application "proposes to compensate Rangen for diminishment of the source." (A.R.,
p. 358). There were no findings that the GWDs' application would "prevent material injury."
The GWDs' application does not "compensate" Rangen for any material injury. Both the
GWDs' application and Rangen's pennit propose using the very same non-consumptive water.
(Exh. 2001). (A.R., p. 189). Regardless of whether the GWDs' application is granted, Rangen
will be diverting the very same water under its own right and applying it to its own beneficial use.
Even if the Districts' pennit is granted, they will not be providing anything that Rangen does not
already have the right to use.
The proposed use also does not prevent material injury.

The GWDs' members are

obligated to compensate for the injury they are causing to the Eastern Snake Plain Aquifer. The
proposed use does not stop the depletion of the aquifer in any way, shape or fonn and it does not
add new water. 4 Most fundamentally, regardless of whether the pennit is granted, Rangen already
has the right to use this \Vater under its own pennit. As such, the application should have been
denied.

4
The District Court concluded that the fact that the GWDs did not being "new water"' might have "relevance
in any
proceeding seeking the approval of any mitigation plan for which the appropriation is intended." (R., p.
199).
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II.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth in Rangen 's Opening Brief and those set forth above, Rangen
respectfully requests that the Court affinn the Director's decision to

Districts' application

for permit.
DATED this 4th day of March, 2016.
BR~J)¥ 1-,AW orFICE , PLLC

--

By: ~
·~
CJR.obyn M. Brody

By:_" ""--~- -,J'--- ----J. Justin May
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